This paper studies the value-relevance of FCD disclosures of European non-financial firms. Our findings show that these firms use FCDs to hedge and not to speculate but that the impact of hedging strategies' disclosures is statistically and economically weak revealing that either (i) managers hedge only a small proportion of the currency risk they are facing, or that (ii) investors make systematic errors when assessing the link between disclosed FCD usage and firms' risk exposures. We find strong evidence in favor of the existence of economies of scale in hedging and that European firms engage in hedging programs in response to tax convexity.
Introduction
Nowadays all firms are facing various sources of exchange rate risk in exercising their daily activities. In this context, financial derivative contracts -such as forwards, swaps and options -provide managers with a whole series of instruments to manage these risks.
However, the question whether implemented hedging strategies are value-relevant or not is still puzzling. While the Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm postulates that the financial risk management activities of a company are irrelevant to shareholder wealth since shareholders have access to the same risk management tools as corporate managers,
we know that hedging activities may potentially be value-increasing by alleviating a series of market imperfections. Stulz (1984) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) , Froot et al. (1993) , Nance et al. (1993) , Mian (1996) , Tufano (1996) , and Geczy et al. (1997) among others have conducted research on these hypothetical rationales for corporate risk management. They provide useful information on numerous valid reasons why companies should consider hedging to maximize shareholder wealth by reducing costs related to financial distress, underinvestment problems and taxes.
In theory, if we assume that hedging activities may be value-enhancing due to existing market imperfections, investors should incorporate the disclosed information related to companies' hedging strategies when characterizing firm value. Empirical evidence on this topic is mixed however. While Allayannis and Weston (2001) , Adam and Fernando (2006) and Carter et al. (2006) show that firm value is statistically and economically significantly positively affected by derivatives positions, Guay and Kothari (2003) , Bartram et al. (2003) as well as Jin and Jorion (2006) suggest that derivatives transactions aren't systematically value-relevant. Since reasons to use derivative instruments may exist to either decrease or increase risk exposure, the question emerges companies, this study is the first extensive analysis on the foreign exchange risk management disclosure practices of a large sample of German, Dutch, Belgian and U.K.
firms. Thanks to this new extensive data set consisting of 471 European multinationals, we are able to provide not only descriptive but also analytical evidence regarding many questions raised in the literature. Second, while most studies exploring firms' hedging incentives employ a dependent binary variable indicating whether a firm uses FCDs or not, we extend this methodology by investigating both the factors that determine a firm's decision to use FCDs and those affecting the level of disclosed FCD usage. Third, we address the question whether investors use the notional amount disclosures of European non-financial firms' derivative usage in assessing firms' foreign exchange exposures and compare our results with previous findings concentrating on the North American market (Venkatachalam, 1996; Adam and Fernando, 2006; Carter et al., 2006; Jin and Jorion, 2006) . 2 We provide evidence on how investors value the impact of currency derivative instruments on companies' stock return sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations 3 and examine whether FCD users are less exposed to market and exchange rate movements than FCD non-users. We specifically verify, moreover, whether the level and significance of measured foreign currency risk exposures reflect the outcomes of financial risk management activities. Finally, our analysis examines the impact of disclosed FCDs both on weekly and monthly exchange rate exposures. The variation of the time period used in estimating the currency exposures gives us not only the possibility to perform robustness checks -by examining if our results vary with the exposure horizon -but it enables us primarily to evaluate the effectiveness of hedging techniques across different time horizons. 4 We are able, in this study, to validate -or refute -one potential explanation for this horizon-dependent impact of currency fluctuations on firm value. A stronger impact of FCD usage on monthly than on weekly foreign risk exposures would de facto suggest that longer-term exposures characterize, to a larger degree, economic exposures that are unrelated to known transactions and hence difficult to hedge.
The paper is organized as follows. After reviewing our research questions in the next section, we describe the sample procedure and data characteristics in section 3
Section 4 provides empirical findings on the determinants of disclosed foreign currency derivative usage while the impact of disclosed derivatives positions on foreign exchange risk exposure is presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Research questions
Under the classical Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm, no financial derivative contract can influence firm value. Assuming perfect capital markets, the classical MM paradigm implies thus that firms have no reasons to engage in hedging activities whereas shareholders of the company who wish to mitigate their risk exposures always have the possibility to perform the necessary hedging transactions on their own. In reality however, capital markets are imperfect and (i) financial distress, (ii) taxes, (iii) information asymmetries and (iv) agency problems are costly to firms. Smith and Stulz (1985) , Bessembinder (1991) , Nance et al. (1993) and Froot et al. (1993) , among others, show why these market imperfections lead to an increase in firm value through hedging activities.
As firms didn't reveal their position in derivatives until the 1990s, the empirical validation of the value-relevance of hedging activities has been confronted with the longlasting unavailability of reliable data on hedging practices. Since then, widespread corporate use of derivatives has been documented in Dolde (1993) , Bodnar et al. (1998) , Berkman and Bradbury (1996) , Berkman et al. (1997) , Henstchel and Kothari (2001) , and Bodnar et al. (2003) . A recent stream of research has also sought to identify which hedging theories best describe a firm's choice to use financial hedging instruments (e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996; Visvanathan, 1998; Pennings and Garcia, 2004; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Joseph, 2000) . More recent studies (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Geczy et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000; Marshall, 2000; Judge, 2006) have even differentiated between different types of risks -e.g., interest rate, currency and commodity risks -suggesting that factors determining derivative usage may differ for each type.
Since reasons to hedge may exist to either decrease or increase risk exposure, the expected effect of financial hedging instruments is primarily an empirical issue.
However, if market imperfections -like those outlined above -exist and if the objectives of corporate derivative usage are to reduce firms' risk exposures, investors should expect that the more derivatives a firm uses to hedge its exposures, the less risk exposure it faces. As a consequence the relationship between firm currency risk exposures and foreign currency derivative usage should be negative. This anticipation is nevertheless based on the assumption that FCDs are exclusively used for hedging while existing theories suggest that firms might also use derivatives to take on additional risks.
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However, the usage of foreign currency derivatives gives rise to the question whether these hedging activities may constitute one possible explanation for the fact that 5 An owner of a leveraged firm can, for instance, have incentives to increase the firm's riskiness in order to transfer wealth from bond holders to stock holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) empirical research has found limited evidence of a significant link between exchange rates movements and firm value (see, e.g., Jorion, 1990; Amihud, 1994; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993) . This argument has first been supported by Bartov and Bodnar (1994) who affirm that firms are aware of their currency exposures and efficiently manage it.
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Analyzing the impact of currency fluctuations on U.S., Japanese and Canadian industries, Bodnar and Gentry (1993) likewise suggest that the reported effect of exchange rates on industry returns is insignificant because companies are using various hedging instruments to hedge their exposure. The difficulty of quantifying the importance of hedging activities doesn't enable them however to test for the impact of these presumed hedging activities.
Similarly acknowledging the impact of hedging activities on exchange rate exposure, several other studies (He and Ng, 1998; Chow and Chen, 1998) examine the relationship between variables that proxy firms' incentives to hedge and estimated exchange rate exposures. Their results suggest that firms with high leverage and low liquidity -thus, having more incentives to hedge -are nevertheless more sensitive to currency fluctuations.
Limited evidence has been found to empirically support the negative relationship between corporate derivative usage and firms' risk exposures. In large part, the lack of evidence is attributable to poor data availability. Among recent papers, Guay (1998) Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2006) tend to suggest that firms use derivatives mainly for hedging -as their use tends to reduce the risk exposure firms face -, Simkins and Laux (1997) as well as Nguyen and Faff (2003) find that the impact of FCD usage on exchange risk exposure is generally weak and lacks consistency. Moreover Nguyen and Faff (2003) fail to document any relationship between the use of FCDs and long horizon exposure.
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In efficient markets investors are assumed to incorporate all the information on firms' derivatives positions in the price discovery process. One of the reasons why some studies fail to relate a significant relationship between derivatives disclosures and firm value may be the fact that companies have the possibility to make disclosures choices that misrepresent the companies' derivative positions and that investors, on the other hand, are confronted with a multitude of different disclosure methods and make systematic errors when characterizing the link between derivatives disclosures and risk exposures. 
Data
This study analyses, as of year-end 2003, the determinants of corporate FCD usage and its role in reducing foreign exchange risk exposure for European non-financial firms established in 4 distinctive sample countries: the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. The selection procedure for the sample used in this study encompasses 5 steps. (Froot et al. 1993; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham et Rogers, 2000) , the observations for the book to market variable tend to suggest that firms that have more investment opportunities use less derivative instruments. Regarding their foreign involvement, approximately 80 percent of the firms in our sample provide precise information on the volume of foreign sales. 20 Among these firms foreign sales account on average for approximately 34 percent of total sales for FCD disclosers while these sales represent on average only 14 percent of total sales for FCD non-disclosers. The exposure to foreign currency movements through foreign sales and trade seems thus to be an important factor explaining the use of FCDs. Usable information on the volume of foreign debt is only disclosed by 94 companies in the Belgian, Dutch and German firm sample. Overall, the ratios of volume of foreign debt to size appear to be larger for firms that disclose financial derivative instruments usage.
Equivalent information on U.K. companies is displayed in Panel B of Table 1 .
Overall observations are in agreement with those reported above. However, in contrast to 18 Among all derivative instruments, forwards appear to be the most intensively used by our sample firms. This observation is consistent with previous empirical findings (Bodnar et al., 1998 , Bartram et al., 2004 . 19 Size is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of total debt. 20 When precise information on the volume of foreign sales isn't provided in firms' annual reports, we consider these variables as missing and don't assume them to be zero.
panel A, only 3 out of 136 U.K. firms declare not to use foreign currency derivatives.
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U.K. companies seem moreover to rely on a higher degree of overseas business and to have stronger international linkages than Belgian, Dutch and German companies.
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Among FCD disclosers foreign sales amount on average to roughly 60 percent of total sales whereas this percentage approximates 30 percent on average for FCD nondisclosers. 23 The ratio of foreign debt to size is similarly higher for FCD disclosers compared to companies that don't report FCD usage.
Empirical evidence on the determinants of foreign currency derivative use
Consistent with Allayannis and Ofek (2001), we examine the decision and the level of FCD use in a two-step procedure originally suggested by Cragg (1971) . We explain thus separately the firm's choice to hedge 24 using FCDs -or not -and the firm's decision of how much to hedge with these instruments.
To model the decision to hedge or not to hedge we use a binary measure of FCD disclosure. Companies that report FCD usage are assigned a value of 1 while all other firms are assigned a value of zero. Variables that have been found to make cash flow volatility costly for companies (see, e.g., Geczy et al., 1997; Schrand and Unal, 1998) (2000) observations on hedging practices of U.K. firms. He noted indeed that a high proportion of U.K. firms that responded to his questionnaire ranked foreign exchange risk management as significantly important or most important. 22 Almost all U.K. firms included in our sample disclose precise information on their volume of foreign sales and foreign debt. 23 Compared to the values reported for Belgian, Dutch and German firms, the higher values exhibited by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales for U.K. firms may be due to the fact that for U.K. firms foreign sales correspond to sales outside of the U.K. whereas for Belgian, Dutch and German firms, foreign sales correspond to sales outside of the euro-zone. 24 We presume here that firms use FCDs primarily for hedging purposes -as claimed in their annual reports. This assumption enables us to test optimal hedging theories. However the question, whether firms use FCDs for hedging or speculation motives will be empirically tested in section 5.
related to financial distress costs motives (Shapiro and Titman, 1985; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Nance et al., 1993) , we use leverage 25 -measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets -, the ratio of EBIT to total interest expenses and the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
Agency costs related incentives to hedge are tested using the ratio of book to market value. Firms with lower book to market ratios are expected to have greater investment opportunities. 26 These firms are potentially facing higher underinvestment costs and are expected, hence, to hedge (Bessembinder, 1991; Froot et al., 1993) . To verify whether liquidity may serve as a hedging substitute, the quick ratio is added to our model. Nance et al.'s (1993) argument that firms retain dividends to reduce their need to hedge is also considered. The tax incentive to hedge is verified by the inclusion of a tax dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has tax-loss carryforwards and 0 otherwise (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Smith, 1999; Graham and Rogers, 2002) . We test the managerial risk aversion hypothesis by the inclusion of a variable that measures the options holdings of CEOs (Breeden and Visvanathan, 1998) . 27 The information asymmetry hypothesis is verified by adding the log of the number of analysts that follow the company (De Marzo and Duffie, 1995) . The log of the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt is used to proxy firm size (Nance et al., 1993) . The ratio of foreign sales to total sales is employed to measure firms' international linkages.
Ultimately we include the relative importance of total foreign debt to firm size to analyze the role of foreign debt in managing foreign currency exposure.
_____________________________
Insert Table 2 _____________________________ The first two columns of Table 2 present the results of the binomial probit model estimated using all sample-firms. In line with previous studies, we observe that foreign involvement, measured as the percentage of foreign sales and size are significantly positively related to the decision to use and disclose FCDs. These results are in contradiction with the bankruptcy costs and informational asymmetries motives to hedge that predict that small firms have a greater incentive to hedge. They support nevertheless the existence of economies of scale in hedging. These economies of scale facilitate the justification of hedging programs when the firm is larger and the volume of foreign activity is sufficiently large to justify the costs (Martin and Mauer, 2004) . Additionally, the significance of the positive tax dummy 28 coefficient in model 1 seems to confirm the convexity-based tax incentive to hedge. The statistically significant positive coefficient of the dividend yield factor indicates moreover that retained dividends may be regarded as a substitute for hedging. The 4 last columns of Table 2 describe the estimation output when additional explanatory variables are progressively added to the model. 29 Overall, most results of column 1 and 2 are confirmed. Furthermore, the volume of foreign debt 30 is found to be a strong incentive to hedge for European firms. These results are in strong 28 The tax dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm has tax loss carryforwards, 0 otherwise. 29 Due to the strong correlation between some explanatory variables the inclusion of additional explanatory variables may require the exclusion of previously incorporated explanatory variables. 30 Foreign debt may be regarded as an operational hedging strategy for net exporting firms. In contrast foreign debt emphasizes the foreign currency risks importing firms are facing. opposition with the expectations described in Geczy et al. (1997) and empirical evidence presented on U.S. multinationals by Elliott et al. (2003) . They support however evidence provided by Fok et al. (1997) that natural hedges -like the use of foreign debt for netexporting firms -complement and don't substitute for the use of FCDs in reducing currency risk. In model 6, the residuals of the regression of the ratio of foreign debt to size against the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and size replace the raw ratios of foreign debt to size in order to avoid the multicolinearity problems arising between these variables. The contemporaneous inclusion of all three variables enables us to identify among these variables the stronger incentives to hedge. Results suggest that the decision to use and disclose FCDs depends more on the percentage of foreign sales and the size of the firm than on the importance of foreign debt. In contrast to previous models, model 6 confirms moreover the financial distress hypothesis. Highly leveraged firms are shown to be significantly more inclined to hedge. In contrast, no evidence is found in support of liquidity acting as a hedging substitute. Similarly, the ratio of EBIT to total assets, the number of analysts and the options held by CEOs are found to have no impact on firms' decision to use and report financial derivative instruments.
The determinants of the extent of FCD disclosure are obtained by estimating a regression where we use the relative importance of the total notional value of FCD contracts 31 to firms' total assets as dependent variable. The sample is restricted to European non-financial firms that do disclose FCD contracts and provide useful 31 As stressed in Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2000) , the fact that firms net positions in individual currencies before disclosing them in the notes of their annual reports may introduce a bias in our measurement of the total notional values of the derivative contracts. However, we believe that our observations nevertheless provide valuable insights in the hedging practices of our sample firms.
information on the notional values of their foreign currency derivative holdings (290 firms).
Insert Table 3 _____________________________ In line with our results of Table 2 , the first 2 columns of Table 3 reveal that international trade linkages -approximated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales -and size are significantly positively related to the level of FCD disclosure. We note however that empirical findings reject the hypothesis that firms with more growth options in their investment opportunity set -approximated by firms with low book to market ratiossuffer more from underinvestment costs and hedge more. To test in how far a convex tax schedule determines the hedging practices of European firms, the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to total assets is also included in the regression model. The significance of the positive tax coefficient strongly confirms the convexity-based tax incentive to hedge.
Consistent with the financial distress costs motives to hedge, we find furthermore that less profitable firms are more inclined to use FCDs than highly profitable ones. Results obtained through the progressive inclusion of additional explanatory variables in our model 33 don't contradict those reported in columns 1 and 2. As expected, we observe in model 4, 5 and 6 that the volume of foreign debt strongly determines the extent of FCD 32 66 firms of our sample state in their annual report that they use FCDs for hedging purposes but don't disclose the notional values of the FCDs contracts. These values are either aggregated with other derivative holdings (e.g. interest rate swaps, commodity derivatives) or missing. 33 Due to the strong correlation between some explanatory variables the inclusion of additional explanatory variables may require the exclusion of previously incorporated explanatory variables.
hedging by European firms. 34 In addition, the extent of FCD disclosure is shown to be negatively related to liquidity which is consistent with liquidity serving as a hedging substitute. We find however no evidence that retained dividends could similarly serve as a hedging substitute. Similarly, neither the information asymmetry nor the managerial risk aversion hypothesis is empirically confirmed. While the positive sign of the debt ratio coefficient is consistent with financial distress costs related incentives to hedge, evidence in support of this hypothesis is overall statistically weak. These results are in line with Graham and Rogers (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) .
Empirical evidence on the impact of corporate derivative usage on foreign exchange risk exposure
Following the extensive literature on foreign exchange risk exposure 35 , we estimate the firm-specific foreign exchange risk exposure -defined as the effect of exchange rate changes on the value of a firm in excess of the global market's reaction to foreign exchange rate movements -with the following augmented market model:
where R i,t designates the total return of firm i in period t, R m,t the Datastream calculated European total market index return in period t, β i firm i's return sensitivity to market fluctuations, X t the rate of return on the trade-weighted effective euro (U.K. pound) exchange rate index -measured as the foreign currencies' exchange price of one euro 34 For model 6, the ratio of foreign debt to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt is first regressed to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and to the log of the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt. The residuals of this regression are consecutively included in model 6. 35 See for instance the pioneer studies by Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion (1990) .
(respectively one U.K. pound). γ i is firm i's exposure to this exchange rate index independent of the effect these variations have on the overall market and ε i,t denotes the white noise error term. 36 Given the definition of our exchange risk factor, a positive exchange rate movement corresponds to an appreciation of the domestic currency (euro or U.K. pound). As we expect exporters to be hurt by an appreciation of their homecurrency and importers to benefit from a similar positive exchange rate change, the γ i coefficient should be negative for net-exporters and positive for net-importers.
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Equivalently, if a firm has net exposed foreign denominated assets, it should suffer from a strengthening home currency, producing a negative exposure effect (i.e., the stock return should decrease in response to a positive exchange rate movement). On the opposite, if a firm has net exposed foreign denominated liabilities, then an appreciation of the domestic currency should benefit it (i.e., the stock return should increase in response to a positive exchange rate movement).
In order to check the robustness of our results to the use of a different source of exchange rate risk, we also perform the analysis using the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (respectively the U.K. pound) instead of using the trade-weighted currency indices. While the trade-weighted exchange rate indices translate better all the exchange rate uncertainties affecting European firms in their trading relationships with different countries, the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates have the advantage of not 36 Including the stock market return in Eq.
(1) dramatically reduces the residual variances of the regression. Moreover, the market return implicitly controls for the value-relevant macroeconomic factors that are correlated with the exchange rates. It is, however, important to stress that according to Eq. (1), the empirical result of having zero exposure does not imply that the firm's value is independent of exchange rates; rather, a zero firm-specific exposure implies that the firm value is affected to the same degree as the market portfolio. 37 The sign of the currency exposure becomes more ambiguous for a company that has importing as well as exporting activities. In this particular situation, the elasticity of the firm's demand for foreign goods relative to the elasticity of the foreign market's demand for the firm's goods have to be taken into account (Adler and Dumas, 1984; He and Ng, 1998) .
being affected by the potential divergent off-setting effects between multiple currencies (Miller and Reuer, 1998) . Results for both exchange risk factor specifications will be simultaneously presented in the rest of the paper. We will empirically verify that the choice of index doesn't lead to major differences in the conclusions of the analysis
In consistence with Allayannis and Ofek (2001) we use a 3-year 38 return period surrounding the year in which annual reports are collected to measure the contemporaneous impact of FCD disclosures on firms' exchange rate exposure -and to verify whether investors use the information contained in FCD disclosures to assess firms' sensitivity to currency risk. The regression estimates obtained using weekly data are presented in Table 4 . exposure values between both sub-samples. Results of these tests suggest that the average market beta of FCD disclosers is statistically higher than the average market beta observed for FCD non-disclosers. Regarding foreign currency exposure coefficients, it is interesting to note that FCD non-disclosers show a statistically stronger negative mean exposure to fluctuations in the trade-weighted exchange rate index, whereas firms reporting FCD usage seem on average to be more strongly negatively affected by U.S. dollar movements.
_____________________________ Insert
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The monthly results of the augmented market model regression (Eq. 4.1) are displayed in Table 5 . In line with previous studies (Muller and Verschoor, 2006) Table 5 _____________________________ It is a common belief that exchange risk exposure is created via foreign operations of a firm and is reduced through the implementation of financial hedging strategies. However, foreign exchange risk effects may also be reduced through alternative channels. As a great number of distinctive exchange rates may affect firm value through many different ways, all these influences may naturally offset each other. When analyzing the impact of FCD disclosure on firms' foreign currency exposure, we therefore include firm size to proxy a firm's international diversification possibilities as well as its ability to implement operational hedging strategies The ratio of foreign sales is also incorporated in subsequent models in order to take a firm's international involvement into account. As previous empirical evidence suggest that among firms with foreign exchange exposure that regularly hedge, there seems to be a tendency to hedge only a small fraction of the total foreign currency exposure of the firms, we expect that the use of FCDs doesn't completely offset the currency risk exposure firms are facing but that it reduces its absolute value and statistical significance (Bodnar et al., 1998) . On the other hand, because of the complex set of issues associated with the interpretation of FCD disclosures, it is possible that investors make systematic errors when characterizing the impact of FCD usage on currency risk exposure.
We examine hence subsequently the link between FCD reports and the significance of firms' exchange rate exposure and the relationship between these disclosures and the magnitude of the exposure. Empirical findings on the impact of FCD disclosures on the significance of foreign exchange risk exposure of European firms are presented in Table 6 .
_____________________________
Insert Table 6 _____________________________ The dependent variable of the probit model is assigned the value 1 if the firm is statistically significantly affected by currency fluctuations and 0 otherwise. 42 Consistent with the view that the percentage of foreign sales to total sales is a reasonable proxy for firms' overall international trade linkages and hence their exposure to exchange rate uncertainty, results suggest that the importance of foreign sales is the major determinant of the significance of firms' currency exposure. The more firms are selling outside of their frontiers the more they seem to be significantly affected by exchange rate 42 Reported results have been obtained with the 10 percent statistical significance level. However to test the robustness of these results, we performed the analysis as well with the 5 percent statistical significance level. Results are consistent and may be obtained from the authors upon request.
fluctuations. The size of a firm is also positively linked to the significance of its foreign exchange risk exposure. On the other hand, we find that firms' decision to use and report FCDs has a negative effect on the significance of their sensitivity to exchange rates. This negative relationship supports the view that non-financial firms use FCDs primarily for hedging purposes -and not for speculation -, it is however statistically insignificant. We may hence conclude that the implemented foreign currency hedging strategies are not able to efficiently reduce the exchange rate risk European companies are effectively facing, respectively that -based on the information disclosed -investors find it difficult to assess the effect of FCD usage on firms' sensitivity to currency fluctuations.
In order to further investigate the impact of FCD disclosures on firms' exchange risk exposure, we focus now on the relationship between the extent of FCD disclosure and the magnitude of the exposure. As mentioned above, the total exposure of a company should be smaller in magnitude when currency derivatives offset exchange rate effects from foreign operations. To empirically assess the relationship between FCD disclosure and the magnitude of foreign exchange risk exposure we, hence, estimate the following model:
where Est.(γ i ) is a firm's exchange risk exposure estimated in (Eq. 1), ln(Size i ) a firm's size -measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt -, (FS/TS) i a firm's ratio of foreign sales to total sales and (FCD/TA) i a firm's ratio of foreign currency derivatives to total assets.
As the foreign operations of positively (net-importers) and negatively (netexporters) exposed firms are presumably completely different in nature, we examine these sub-samples of firms separately. In a first stage we estimate Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares.
Insert Table 7 _____________________________ The first regression outputs of panel A and B of Table 7 show that while the link between foreign currency exposure and the level of FCD disclosure has the expected sign, it is nonetheless again statistically insignificant. These findings confirm our view that the use of financial derivative instruments by European firms either doesn't significantly reduce their sensitivity to exchange rate movements or isn't properly acknowledged by investors.
As expected, we find however that for net-importing companies -that are positively affected by currency movements -foreign sales tend to naturally offset the impact of exchange rate movements. Concurrently, the exposure of net-exporting firms appears to be strengthened through the existence of high foreign sales volumes. Finally, the positive (negative) relationship between firm size and negative (positive) exposure coefficients supports the argument that larger firms have greater access to international diversification benefits and operational hedging practices. Pantzalis et al. (2001) similarly conclude that firms with a greater breadth of foreign operations have lower foreign exchange rate exposure.
Following Chow and Chen (1998) and Nguyen and Faff (2003) we examine next whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that are considered in the literature as proxies for firms' incentives to hedge: Table 7 . We observe, in particular, that firms with high liquidity tend to be more exposed to currency movements. These results are in favor of Froot et al.'s (1993) argument that highly liquid firms have less incentive to hedge than firms that are facing strong liquidity constraints and are susceptible to be hurt by an increase in cashflow volatility. Further empirical findings tend to support the view that firms with high debt ratios and strong growth opportunities are strongly affected by currency movements.
These relations aren't however statistically significant. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the value-relevance of disclosures about foreign exchange risk management practices of European companies. In a first stage, we are concerned with the motives that lead firms to use and report currency derivatives as well as the factors that affect their decision on how much to hedge with these instruments. In a second stage, the extent to which these disclosures affect their foreign exchange risk exposure is thoroughly investigated. The major contribution of this paper is that it provides a unique insight in European firms' hedging strategies as well as an in-depth analysis of the real impacts of these hedging strategies' disclosures on firms' risk exposures.
Consistent with previous studies, the main determinants of FCD use and disclosure are found to be the percentage of firms' foreign trading volumes and size.
While these results seem to contradict the financial distress costs and informational asymmetries motives to hedge, they provide evidence in favor of the existence of economies of scale in hedging. When the firm is larger and the volume of foreign activity is sufficiently large to justify the costs, the implementation of hedging programs appears to be strongly facilitated. Further, our results lend support to the argument that the existence and extent of tax loss carryforwards play a significant role in explaining firms' use of financial derivative instruments. The positive relationship between the percentage of foreign denominated debt and the disclosure of FCDs reveals moreover that both types of instruments are complements in hedging foreign currency risk. Finally, in contrast to optimal hedging theories (Froot et al., 1993) , our empirical findings suggest that the more growth opportunities companies have, the less they report FCD usage.
The second part of this paper investigates the role of FCD disclosure in influencing the significance and magnitude of firms' sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations. The relationship between firm value and currency movements has been documented both for weekly and monthly observation horizons to examine the effect of FCD disclosures on both the short-and medium-term currency exposure of European firms. Overall, most European companies in our sample are found to behave like netexporters -being negatively affected by a depreciation of foreign currencies. Empirical evidence reveals as well that the impact of exchange rate changes on firm value becomes more evident when lengthening the observation horizon. Our empirical results lend strong support to the hypothesis that the degree of international involvement -approximated by the percentage of foreign sales -is a major determinant of firms' currency risk exposure.
Size, on the other hand, appears to be negatively related to exchange rate exposure. The negative role of size tends to support the argument that larger firms benefit from the diversification of their foreign operations and are to a greater extent capable of implementing operational hedging strategies. Furthermore, firms with high liquidity ratios and firms with high growth opportunities and leverage appear to be more sensitive to currency fluctuations. These findings are informative since they show that companies that use liquidity as a substitute for hedging as well as companies that are particularly vulnerable to cash-flow-volatility tend to be particularly affected by exchange rate movements. Ultimately, our evidence supports unanimously the assumption that European companies use FCDs not to speculate on the foreign exchange markets but to protect themselves against currency fluctuations. However these derivatives' disclosures are shown to have statistically weak effects. Similarly, no conclusive evidence could be found to corroborate managers' stronger capacity to hedge the short-term versus longterm currency exposure of the company.
It is important to note that when investigating the relation between the disclosure of FCDs and firms' currency exposure, our empirical findings are shown to be highly robust to the use of a wide range of alternative specifications. Results lead to the same conclusions when a different exchange risk factor or a shorter sample period is utilized for the estimation of firms' exposure to currency movements. Findings are likewise found to be robust to the use of different estimation methodologies (e.g., ordinary least squares, weighted least squares and probit regressions).
In general, this series of results may be interpreted as further evidence that (i) managers are using FCDs to hedge only a small proportion of the currency risk they are facing and that these hedging activities are mostly unsystematic, (ii) respectively that investors make systematic errors when assessing the impact of FCD usage on risk exposures. Additionally, the fact that the relationship between currency movements and firm value is statistically and economically weaker in the short-run -as compared to the long-run -may not be attributed to managers' stronger capacity to hedge short-term versus long-term currency exposure. † Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. ‡ Leverage is defined as the ratio of long term debt to total assets. § Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-euro zone countries (Sales to non-euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). § § Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. Intercept -9.4991*** -8.2269*** -9.6051*** -8.3984*** -10.5028* -9.4717*** -5,0271 -4,2322 -4,0418 -3,3699 -1,7487 -2,9850 Foreign Sales a / Total Sales 3.1412*** 3.2397*** 3.6836*** 5.0068*** This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm discloses foreign currency exposure hedging with FCDs and proxies for incentives to hedge respectively proxies for complement or substitute hedging activities. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. a Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-euro zone countries (Sales to non-euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. b Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. c Tax convexity is measured by a dummy variable that is assigned the value 0 if the firm has tax loss carryforwards and 0 otherwise. d Managerial options are calculated as the ratio of CEO's option holdings multiplied by the year-end price of the firm share to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt. e In model 6 the ratio foreign debt to size is replaced by the residuals of the regression of the ratio of foreign debt to size against the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and size. -0,1604 -0,1908 -0,1442 -0,1539 -0,2066 -1,6751 -1,2809 -1,4096 -1,0052 -0,7731 -1,2398 Foreign -0,5642 -0,8289 -1,1047 -2,1295 -1,6772 EBIT / Interest Expenses -0,0003 This table presents OLS regression estimates of the relation between the extent of utilization of FCDs and proxies for incentives to hedge respectively proxies for complement or substitute hedging activities. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. a Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-euro zone countries (Sales to non-euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. b Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. c Tax convexity is measured by the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to total assets. d Managerial options are calculated as the ratio of CEO's option holdings multiplied by the year-end price of the firm share to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt. e FCD is approximated by the disclosed total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. f In model 6 the ratio foreign debt to size is replaced by the residuals of the regression of the ratio of foreign debt to size against the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and size. 
where R i,t designates the total return of firm i in period t, R m,t the Datastream calculated European total stock market return in period t, β i firm i's return sensitivity to market fluctuations, θ t the movement in the trade-weighted euro (U.K. pound) exchange rate index -Panel A -, respectively the movement in the bilateral euro (U.K. pound) / U.S. dollar exchange rate -Panel B -, γ i firm i's exposure to these exchange rate movements, h i,t denotes the conditional variance of the residuals; δ i , τ i and ν i unknown parameters; and µ i,t represents the white noise error term. The GARCH (1, 1) specification is added to Eq. (1) to take the heteroskedasticity of weekly returns into account. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. † The equality of mean hypothesis is tested using a t-test verifying whether the variability between the sample means (between groups) is the same as the variability within any subgroup. ‡ The equality of median hypothesis is tested using a Chi-squared rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. 
where R i,t designates the total return of firm i in period t, R m,t the Datastream calculated European total stock market return in period t, β i firm i's return sensitivity to market fluctuations, θ t the movement in the trade-weighted euro (U.K. pound) exchange rate index -Panel A -, respectively the movement in the bilateral euro (U.K. pound) / U.S. dollar exchange rate -Panel B -, γ i firm i's exposure to these exchange rate movements and ε i,t represents the white noise error term. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. † The equality of mean hypothesis is tested using a t-test verifying whether the variability between the sample means (between groups) is the same as the variability within any subgroup. ‡ The equality of median hypothesis is tested using a Chi-squared rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm is significantly exposed to currency exposure and firm size, the percentage of foreign sales to total sales and the use -or not -of foreign currency derivatives. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. † Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. ‡ The FCD disclosure dummy variable is assigned the value 1 if the firm reports the use of foreign currency derivatives in the notes to their annual reports and 0 otherwise. ‡ ‡ FCD is approximated by the disclosed total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. § Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-euro zone countries (Sales to non-euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. This table presents OLS regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm is significantly exposed to currency exposure and firm size, the percentage of foreign sales to total sales and the extent of FCD disclosure. The second OLS regression outputs reports results when liquidity, leverage and market to book value are included in the estimation model. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. † Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. § FCD usage is approximated by the disclosed total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. ‡ Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-euro zone countries (Sales to non-euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. This table presents WLS regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm is significantly exposed to currency exposure and firm size, the percentage of foreign sales to total sales and the extent of FCD disclosure. The second OLS regression outputs reports results when liquidity, leverage and market to book value are included in the estimation model. The weighting factors are the t-statistics of the exposure coefficients. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. † Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. § FCD usage is approximated by the disclosed total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. ‡ Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-euro zone countries (Sales to non-euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries.
